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TO REMEMBER LIKE A DIPLOMAT1
  H A A KON A .  I KONOMOU
The end of the story is what equates the present with the past, 
the actual with the potential. The hero is who he was.2
INTRODUCTION
The Norwegian electorate’s ‘no’ to entry into the European Community (EC), Sep-
tember 1972, was a kick in the teeth for the established political, economic and 
administrative elites of Norway.3 In fact, the two biggest parties (Labour and the 
Conservatives), most of the parliament (Storting), the big export oriented econo-
mic sectors and the shipping industry, the majority of the leading national news-
papers, and almost all of the administrative elite were in favour of membership. 
Yet, it did not happen. Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the EC in January 1973, 
while Norway negotiated a trade agreement with the newly enlarged Community.4
The blow was particularly hard for a small group of multilateral economic di-
plomats – simply called the Europeans – who had worked continuously with the 
EC-case for 12 years.5 Through their work they became professionally, and later 
1 I would like to thank Giles Scott-Smith, Karen Gram-Skjoldager, Dino Knudsen, Michael An-
dersen, Johann Leitz, Pernille Østergaard Hansen and the ‘Nyt Diplomati’-workshop, Saxo-
Institute, Copenhagen University, March 13, 2014 for valuable comments and good discus-
sions. I would also like to thank the diplomats interviewed, who have shared their life, work 
and thoughts with me – I am very grateful. Last I would like to thank the two anonymous 
reviewers who have given me many useful tips and corrections. Any mistakes and omis-
sions, of course, remain mine.
2 Paul Ricoeur: ”Narrative and time”, Critical Inquiry 7(1), 1980, pp. 169-190, p. 186.
3 53,5% of the electorate voted against membership. The young, the lower social stratum and 
the periphery were overrepresented on the no-side. 
4 See for example: Rolf Tamnes: Oljealder, bd.6 Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, Oslo: Universi-
tetsforlaget 1997; Jan van der Harst (ed.): Beyond the Customs Union: The European Commu-
nity’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975, Nomos: Baden-Baden 2007.
5 Haakon A. Ikonomou: Europeans – Norwegian Diplomats and the Enlargement of the Europe-
an Community, 1960-1972, Unpublished PhD thesis, Florence: EUI 2015. The name European 
is both a category that I use to capture this group of diplomats analytically, and a name they 
used to describe themselves in the interviews. It is also an adaptation of historian Robin 
Allers’ term ‘Europa-experten’ denoting a more emotional connection with the cause. In-
terview 18.12.2012 “Eivinn Berg”; Robin Allers: Besondere Beziehungen – Deutschland, Nor-
wegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt (1966-1974), Bonn: Dietz Verlag 2009. It is unclear when 
exactly they started to use this term to describe themselves, but the term ‘a good Europe-
an’ or ‘a committed European’ was used about them by other diplomats in the 1960s. Brit-
ish Foreign Of ice Archives 30/1026 – 8 July 1971, Oslo (British Embassy) – G.A. Crossley – 
Dear Norman; 
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personally, convinced of the attributes of membership. Moreover, they came to 
fundamentally believe in the EC as a vehicle of peace. The Norwegian ‘no’ was 
not only experienced as ‘an institutional shock’ for the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (MFA), but was also experienced as a professional and personal defeat for 
the Europeans.6 Indeed, many of them left the service following the referendum. 
They had failed to deliver the necessary result in the negotiations, and they had 
been unable to convince the electorate of the, in their eyes, inherent righteous-
ness of the endeavour.
The fundamental question of this article is: How did and do these diplomats 
create a meaningful narrative from the professional and personal failure of the 
negative referendum? As will be argued, the Europeans have reconciled the ing-
rained and institutionalized understanding of ‘the diplomat’ as a heroic character 
with the traumatic experience of the Norwegian ‘no’, by recasting themselves as 
martyrs professionally sacri iced for a just cause. Memories of the Second World 
War, their role as diplomats, the membership issue, and the failed referendum, 
all form part of the same narration. Peace in Europe, an important component of 
their belief in the European cause in the 1960s was elevated to something moral-
ly unassailable. Martyrdom became a transmuted version of their earlier visions 
of themselves as heroic diplomats and believers in the European cause. As heroic 
believers that professionally sacri iced themselves for a (higher) cause they now 
came to narrate themselves as symbolic martyrs.
It is unsurprising that the Second World War and notions of European integra-
tion as a peace project were prominent in the minds of the Europeans in the 1960s, 
following the negative referendum, and today. After all the devastating experi-
ences of the Second World War was at the heart of why the six original member 
states of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) chose to pool sovereign-
ty. ‘Peace’, and the aim to overcome old nationalist rivalries, was explicitly linked 
to integration in the preamble of the Treaty of Paris that established the ECSC.7 It 
is perhaps equally unsurprising that the professional stories of the diplomat had 
a heroic streak to them. What is interesting however, is how memories, events 
and professional stories were recon igured – or re-emplotted – at different times: 
the importance and meaning of the different ‘components’ changed according to 
where in time we enter and try to disentangle them. And it is the emplotment and 
re-emplotment before and after the negative referendum in 1972 and up until to-
day that is the key interest of this article. 
6 Iver B. Neumann: ”Norway. The Foreign Ministry: Bracketing Interdependence”, in Brian 
Hocking (ed.): Foreign Ministries – Change and Adaptation, Basingstoke 1999, pp. 152-169. It 
was an institutional shock because the MFA discovered that it could not negotiate and ‘talk’ 




What is gained from studying how the Europeans remembered themselves? 
There is a broad literature on collective memories, European and national identi-
ty8, also in relation to European integration.9 There are also studies covering how 
diplomats narrate their successes in relation to the European Community (EC). 
And as Thomas Raineau has argued in the case of Britain, diplomats, as part of a 
country’s administrative elite, and their memories (often in the form of memoirs) 
play a signi icant part in shaping historical narratives of past political events.10 
However, there are very few studies that try to investigate memories of diplomats 
centred on failures. Likewise, there are none, to this author’s knowledge, that try 
to incorporate the professional role of the diplomat to make sense of these memo-
ries. To this is added the broader signi icance of exploring the memories of pro-
European actors in a non-joining country, which goes to break down the progres-
sive narrative – and the distinction between inside and outside – so dominant in 
European integration historiography.11 
APPROACH – MAKING SENSE OF MEMORY
The analysis builds on interviews with several of the former diplomats who were 
at the heart of the negotiations between the EC and Norway, and who played a 
central part in the referendum of September 1972 in combination with a wide 
range of written sources.12 The methodological challenge is to analytically cap-
8 When the works of Maurice Halbwachs were revived in the late 1970s and 1980s a pletho-
ra of works with this focus emerged. One classic is the seven volume collaborative project 
headed by Pierre Nora: Les Lieux de Mémoire, Paris: Galimard, published between 1981 and 
1992. Two journals also saw the light of day: History and Memory, Indiana: Indiana Universi-
ty Press, a journal founded in the late 1980s with focuses on the collective memories of Na-
zism, Fascism and the Holocaust. And the more recent (2008) Memory Studies London: Sage 
Publications which brings together an (almost too) broad palette of approaches.
9 See for example the collaborative work: Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn (eds.): Collective 
Memory and European Identity. The Effects of Integration and Enlargement, Aldershot: Ash-
gate 2005.
10 Thomas Raineau: “Keepers of the European lame? Narratives and Self-representation of 
British diplomats in historical perspective”, in Dino Knudsen and Haakon A. Ikonomou 
(eds.): New Diplomatic History – An introduction, Copenhagen: PubliCom, University of Co-
penhagen 2015.
11 The call for breaking down the teleological language (and understanding) of European in-
tegration history came irst from Mark Gilbert: “Narrating the Process. Questioning the 
Progressive Story of European Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies 46 (3), 2008, 
pp. 641-62. Recently, Kiran Patel has pointed to need for “a less EU-centric form of writing 
European integration history”. Kiran Klaus Patel: “Provincializing the European Commu-
nities. Cooperation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective”, Contemporary 
European History 22, 2013 p. 649'.
12 The former diplomats were between the age of 77 and 92 at the time the interviews were 
conducted. All of the interviews were semi-structured and open-ended, and conducted at 
their homes. The seven interviewed are: Eivinn Berg, Arild Holland, Arne Langeland, Håkon 
W. Freihow, Tancred Ibsen Jr., Terje Johannessen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The rest of the 
core Multilateral Economic Diplomats (MEDs) and Europeans were: Jahn Halvorsen, Wil-
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ture the Europeans’ memories while connecting these with their historical expe-
rience of the EC-case in a way that gives a greater understanding of both. This ar-
ticle attempts to do this through a two-pronged approach. 
First, it builds on French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of mea-
ning and narratives, and combines it with new insights on memory and inter-
views from the ield of oral history. Ricoeur’s conceptual framework offers two 
bene its in relation to collective memory studies and oral history. Maurice Hal-
bwachs, upon which much collective memory studies build, saw memory as inhe-
rently social and collective, as something that moved beyond memories of lived 
experiences (historical memory), and as a process through which social cohesion 
was achieved.13 Ricoeur, on the other hand, bids a crisp analytical tool to under-
stand narration as it creates meaning for the individual, but does not exclude the 
collective cohesion that could come from sharing such narratives. Oral history 
does give heed to individual memory. Some adhere to the postmodernist or post-
structuralist notion that language and discourse do not re lect the social and ma-
terial world, they construct it, while others are more concerned with giving voice 
to the voiceless.14 In this landscape, Ricoeur offers a hermeneutical middle way: 
for while there is certainly a ‘ ictionalizing’ or creative element to remembering, 
there is a bond to the social reality of lived experiences of the past.15
Ricoeur viewed self-understanding as constantly interpreted and de ined 
through a hermeneutical narration of the self.16 Things that happen to us, Ricoeur 
argues, are given meaning through a narrative ‘emplotment’ in which events are 
ordered to uphold the plot. Thus, narratives do not necessarily operate with a li-
near understanding of time – instead events are connected to create a meaning-
ful ‘self’ in the present. Or, as ethnologist Michael Andersen re lects: “The narra-
liam G. Solberg, Knut Frydenlund, Asbjørn Skarstein, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt and Sigurd 
Ekeland. Søren Chr. Sommerfelt wrote memoirs; Søren Christian Sommerfelt: Sendemann: 
Utenrikspolitisk seilas- minner og betraktninger, Oslo: Schibsted 1997. The author has inter-
viewed Asbjørn Skarstein’s daughter, Tove Skarstein, also a diplomat, and, Thorvald Stol-
tenberg, who was not part of the core of MEDs in the 1960s, but was a diplomat, and became 
state secretary in the MFA, under Andreas Cappelen (Foreign Minister), in the Bratteli gov-
ernment (Labour), between March 1971 and October 1973. These sources have been sup-
plemented with sources from the Norwegian MFA-archives (UD), the British Foreign Of ice 
Archives (FCO); news articles; obituaries; entries in lexica and memoirs. 
13 Maurice Halbwachs: On Collective Memory (Edited, Translated, and with an Introduction by 
Lewis A. Coser), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1992.
14 Anna Green: “Can Memory be Collective?”, in Donald A. Richie (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of 
Oral History, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 96-111.
15 Which does not necessarily collide with poststructuralist work engaged in ways in which 
subjects mediate discourses in particular historical settings. Kathleen Canning: “Feminist 
History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and Experience”, Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 19 (2), 1994.
16 Mads Hermansen and Jacob Dahl Rendtorff (red.): En hermeneutisk brobygger, tekster av 
Paul Ricæur, Århus: Klim 2002.
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tive portrays how things ‘had to happen’ for the plot to be as it is and, in doing so, 
meaning is created”.17 This ‘emplotment’ twirls important life events, such as ex-
periences of war or death, major victories or defeats, together: Such emotionally 
charged memories, though temporally disconnected, might be narrated together 
and given “a shared signi icance”.18 Starting with the interviews with the Euro-
peans, this article distinguishes two such life events – the Second World War and 
the EC-case – and explores how they are narrated together to make sense of the 
negative referendum.
As famous poet and novelist Emanuel Litvinoff noted, memory is a literary 
exercise that “shapes our yesterdays into narrative form, an inevitably ictionali-
zing process”.19 In an interview situation therefore, the historian must be aware 
that memory is not “a passive depository of facts, but an active process of crea-
tion of meanings”.20 This ‘ ictionalizing process’ is continuous: As one moves for-
ward, the past is continuously altered to it one’s new ‘location’. Accordingly, this 
article understands the Europeans’ narratives from the point of view of the con-
clusion, and the ‘chain of meaningful events’ as being narrated and pushed ‘back 
in time’.21 At the same time it tries to incorporate the fact that this creation of me-
aning has happened continuously through their lived life. Memories of the Second 
World War were structured and structuring for the Europeans in the 1960s as 
well as today. Their thoughts on war, peace and integration are ‘put into play’ in 
different ways depending on time and context. Therefore, we need to grasp how 
it shaped their worldview and self-understanding at the time, and how this in turn 
is interpreted in the present. It is here that the combination of oral history and 
archive-based history is of value: Narratives evident in the interviews – that link 
up events in a manner shaped by their current ‘location’ – tease out important 
aspects of their thoughts and ideas otherwise hard to spot in the archival mate-
rial of the 1960s. And opposite, the archival material helps trace how narratives, 
ideas, and chronologies have been constructed over time, have changed, are ridd-
led with ‘inconsistencies’, and shape their present views.22
17 Michael Andersen: A Question of Location – Life with Fatigue after Stroke, Unpublished PhD 
thesis, Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen 2013, p. 11.
18 Alistair Thomson: “Memory and remembering in oral history”, in Donald A. Richie (ed.): 
The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 83-85; See 
also Daniel Schacter: The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers, Bo-
ston: Houghton Mif lin 2001, pp. 15-16.
19 Emanuel Litvinoff: Journey through a small planet, London: Joseph 1972.
20 Alessandro Portelli: “What Makes Oral History Different”, in Robert Perks and Alistair 
Thomson (eds.): The Oral History Reader, London: Routledge 2006, p. 77.
21 Ricoeur: ”Narrative and time”, p. 174.
22 I’m aware of the methodological hazards here, for one runs the risk of reading things into 
documents from the past, simply because this is something the interviewed person empha-
sises today. There is no easy way around this, the historian must read both sources careful-
ly, and be aware of the weaknesses and strengths of both.
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Second, the article builds on social anthropologist and political scientist Iver 
B. Neumann’s notion of diplomats adhering to three ingrained, professional ‘stor-
ies’: the bureaucratic, heroic and mediator story.23 In his 2012 study of contem-
porary Norwegian diplomats, Neumann argued that when entering the Norwe-
gian Foreign Service, young and promising aspirants are “exposed to a diplomatic 
discourse that offers various stories of how to be a diplomat”.24 These stories of 
what makes up a good (and bad) diplomat, are embedded in the discourses and 
practices of the diplomatic ield and the MFA as an institution. Diplomats acquire, 
adhere to, and interpret these stories through diplomatic practice – this way they 
subscribe to the stories ‘to which they are supposed to subscribe’.25 As opposed 
to roles, which are context speci ic, Neumann argues that stories are relevant and 
meaningful in several contexts, and make up truly ingrained and internalized un-
derstandings of self. Thus, stories, could be understood as collectively accessible, 
and institutionalized, diplomatic narratives. Or, put differently, stories are ‘temp-
lates’ of the core of what it means to be a good diplomat. Using Neumann’s stories 
as ideal types, we may explore the Europeans’ understanding of what made a good 
(and bad) diplomat, and how they rede ined their professional self post-referen-
dum. Equipped with these analytical tools, the article considers how the Europe-
ans remember and narrate themselves and the experience of working with the 
Norwegian bid for membership in the EC. 
First, the article looks into how the victorious anti-marketeers’ critique of the 
Europeans in the early 1970s fundamentally challenged their understanding of 
themselves as heroic diplomats. Second, it investigates how the Europeans retell 
their experiences of the Second World War, the quest for peace through interna-
tional co-operation and their support of Norway joining the EC as a connected 
story. Last, the article explores how the martyr-narrative, born out of the negati-
ve referendum, is enforced by the Europeans’ present existence in the margins of 
Norwegian political discourse.
THE EUROPEANS AND THE EC-CASE
A handful of diplomats, most of them educated economists, and most of them spe-
cialised in multilateral diplomacy, worked with the EC-case through three rounds 
of applications and negotiations – 1960-1963; 1967; and 1970-1972.26 The French 
23 Iver B. Neumann: At home with the Diplomats – Inside a European Foreign Ministry, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 2012.
24 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 99.
25 Raymond Boudon: The Logic of Social Action: An introduction to Sociological Analysis, Lon-
don: Routledge 1979, p. 40. This is a twist of Boudon’s de inition of what a role is.
26 Of the 15 Multilateral Economic Diplomats (MEDs) that constituted the core of the Europe-
ans, 2/3s were educated after war, nearly 50 % were economists, 20 % educated in the so-
cial sciences, and only 33 % were lawyers. This was a major shift, away from lawyers domi-
nating the Foreign Service, as the young war generation entered the service.
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President, General Charles de Gaulle denied Britain’s two irst bids for members-
hip in the Community – and effectively shut the door on Denmark, Ireland and 
Norway too, as neither the EC nor the smaller applicant countries envisioned 
a membership without the UK. The third round, following the retirement of de 
Gaulle and the relance of Europe at the Summit of The Hague in December 1969, 
was, after long and strenuous negotiations, successful. Britain, Denmark, Ireland 
and Norway all signed the accession treaties in January 1972.27 
However, in Norway the negotiation result had to be approved by ¾ of the par-
liament (Storting), and, de facto, the majority of the people through a consultative 
referendum. From January, until the referendum, September 25, 1972, a divisive, 
bitter and unusually heated political struggle between the ‘yes’-side and the ‘no’-
side began in earnest. As MFA state secretary at the time Thorvald Stoltenberg 
later noted, tongue- irmly-in-cheek: “It was the closest modern time Norway has 
been to an outright civil war”.28
As I have argued elsewhere, the Europeans were forged together, networked 
and politicised, through their work with the EC-case. By the early 1970s, they 
were both professionally and personally convinced that Norway needed to be-
come a member of the EC.29 At this point, the Europeans were more or less willingly 
thrown into the pro-European referendum campaign of the Labour Government 
in 1972.30 They toured the country to inform the public about the negotiation re-
sult, and helped set up call-centres and automatic answering machines to answer 
questions from the public. The MFA, in close cooperation with the European Mo-
vement in Norway and the ‘Yes to the EC’-campaign, printed pamphlets, posters 
and other material. This, bordering on political, engagement of the Europeans, 
with the Norwegian electorate was unprecedented.31 
However, the anti-marketeers with their effective grassroot movements won 
the hearts of the undecided. One reason was their ability to successfully ‘tap into’ 
historically and culturally loaded discourses of ‘Europe’ being something diffe-
rent than ‘Norway’.32 Membership would entail a loss of Norway’s hard-won sove-
27 For the inal negotiations, see for example Uwe Kitzinger: Diplomacy and Persuasion: How 
Britain Joined the Common Market, London: Thames and Hudson 1973; Con O’Neill: Britain’s 
Entry into the European Community: Report on the Negotiations of 1970-1972, London: Frank 
Cass Publishers 2000; Morten Rasmussen: Joining the European Communities. Denmark’s 
Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973, Unpublished PhD thesis, EUI 2004; Jan van der Harst 
(ed.) Beyond the Customs Union; Robin M. Allers: “Attacking the Sacred Cow. The Norwegian 
Challenge to the EC’s Acquis Communautaire in the Enlargement Negotiations of 1970-72”, 
Journal of European Integration History 16 (2), 2010.
28 Interview 24.02.2014: “Thorvald Stoltenberg”. My translation.
29 Ikonomou: Europeans.
30 Arild Holland: Utenrikstjenestens historie Unpublished memoirs: Oslo 1997, pp. 21-22.
31 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Øyvind Østerud and Jon Elster (eds.): De Utro Tjenere – Embetsverket i 
EF-kampen, Oslo: PAX forlag 1974; Gleditsch and Hellevik: Kampen om EF, pp. 128-148.
32 Iver B. Neumann: Norge – en kritikk. Begrepsmakt i Europa-debatten, Oslo: Pax Forlag 2001.
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reignty, they argued, and was therefore a threat to Norway’s future existence.33 
This was captured in the slogan: ‘Self-determination’.34 The referendum in Sep-
tember 1972 was cast as this generation’s opportunity to protect the right to self-
determination. The choice was effectively portrayed as a struggle between bina-
ry oppositions: ‘State’ vs. ‘People’, ‘Bureaucracy’ vs. ‘Parliament’, ‘Constitution’ vs. 
‘Treaty of Rome’, ‘Sovereignty’ vs. ‘Union’, ‘Norway’ vs. ‘Europe’.35 It was a linear 
and rhetorically powerful interpretation of history, already well developed in the 
irst no-campaign in 1961:
When big decisions were taken in our country’s history – in 1814, 1905 and 1940 – a 
united people stood behind the choices. These decisions form the basis for our coun-
try’s social, economic and cultural progress in recent times and obliges our genera-
tion to lead in the same direction.36
The Europeans could not escape this discourse – they were submerged in its lan-
guage and were acutely aware of how problematic it was with regard to the EC-
case.37 Furthermore, the Europeans – a bureaucratic elite with historical ties to the 
unions with Denmark and Sweden – were constrained by how they were percei-
ved.38 For example, the Christian People’s Party parliamentarian, Asbjørn Haugs-
tvedt, could argue: “As far as I can tell, full membership in the EC represents an 
open break with traditional Norwegian democracy ( folkestyre). Ever since 1814, 
we have fought for the people’s right to govern the country, often against the ci-
vil servant regime”.39 And Bjørn Unneberg of the Agrarian Party could maintain: 
If we look at our history, we see that pro-union parties existed both 1814 and 1905, 
which argued that Norway was best served by joining bigger [political] entities. Tho-
33 Denmark-Norway was a union between the two kingdoms Denmark and Norway which 
lasted from 1380 to 1814, when Norway entered into a personal union, under the Swedish 
king, which lasted until 1905.
34 Tor Bjørklund: Mot strømmen. Kampen mot EF 1961-1972, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1982.
35 Neumann: Norge – en kritikk.
36 The anti-marketeers irst parole against membership in 1961 quoted from Hans Fredrik 
Dahl: “Norge på en ny måte”, in Neumann: Norge – en kritikk, p. 11. My translation.
37 Ikonomou: Europeans.
38 As Neumann notes, out of a heterogeneous group of immigrant families grew – from the 
1600s onwards – a self-aware, self-recruiting class with both the will and ability to admin-
ister the state. These families constituted the state, societal and economic elite of the 1600-
1800s. Making up about one per cent of the population living on Norwegian territory, they 
were the undisputed ‘aristocracy’ of Denmark-Norway. Many of the diplomats in postwar 
Norway hailed from these old civil servant families. Neumann: Norge – en kritikk, p. 44. 
See also: Øystein Rian: ”Hva og hvem var staten i Norge?”, in Erling Ladewig Petersen (ed.): 
Magtstaten i Norden i 1600-tallet og dens sociale konsekvenser, Odense: Odense Universitets-
forlag 1984, pp. 73-98.
39 Asbjørn Haugstvedt, Stortingstidende (St.t.) (1972), p. 3286-3287. My translation.
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se days it was the right side in Norwegian politics and the civil servants. Today it is the 
Federation of Norwegian Industries, Norwegian Bankers’ Association, civil servants 
and party of icials.40 
The diplomat – the quintessential civil servant – was in this discourse a foreign 
element, in cahoots with continental capitalists and great powers. Leftist wri-
ter, political activist and anti-marketeer Sigbjørn Hølmebakk eloquently captu-
red this when he spoke about the MFA’s information campaign at an anti-marke-
teer rally in 1972: 
I thought it would be best to begin with the MFA’s brochures. I don’t know if I did this 
because I had helped to pay for them, or because I still held on to the childish, innocent 
belief that the MFA wouldn’t lie. So, I sat down and read, as the lilies of the valley blos-
somed and the mackerel started to seep into the Lista jord. It was the stupidest thing 
I could have done. Because slowly I realised that this was not information. It was pro-
paganda. It was not clarifying, it was concealing. There was no attempt to shed light 
on dark and unknown places. The lighting was muted and soft, so as to make it inti-
mate and pleasant, in order to create sweet music about cooperation and community 
in our hearts. This was the elegant rape in morning dress and pin stripes. So, I put the 
brochures down and went on the jord.41
The elegant, smooth-talking and well-dressed MFA-men were contrasted with 
the pure, unspoiled and innocent jord: Civilised Europe versus Natural Norway. 
In this dichotomy ‘the diplomat’ was an agent of Civilised Europe.
Throughout the EC-debacle, the anti-marketeers continuously accused the 
Europeans of propagating for membership. Already during the irst round, the EC 
sceptic newspaper Dagbladet claimed that full membership would mean “the gra-
dual dismantlement of the Norwegian nation state”, and that the MFA tried to con-
ceal this.42 The MFA’s propaganda in favour of membership in the EC was “discou-
raging, immoral and excessive”, the newspaper concluded.43 Shortly before the 
referendum in 1972, parliamentary leader for the Liberal Party Gunnar Garbo 
claimed the parliament’s appropriations to the MFA’s information campaign had 
been squandered away on “spreading shallow, unreliable and unfounded infor-
mation”, and claimed that “the Ministry’s statements [were] clearly misleading”.44 
40 Bjørn Unneberg, Stortingstidende (St.t.) (1972), p. 3291. My translation.
41 Sigbjørn Hølmebakk: “Varmen fra et gammelt halmbål - Tale ved Folkebevegelsens aksjon-
suke i Tromsø, 26. August 1972”, in Sigbjørn Hølmebakk: Ta ikke denne uro fra meg, Oslo: 
Gyldendal 1982, pp. 205-218. My translation.
42 Dagbladet 04.04.1962, 28.10.1962.
43 Dagbladet 21.03.1963.
44 UD 44.36/6.84 Informasjon – Arbeiderbladet 31.07.1972, “Spørsmål og svar”.
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Certain journalists went so far as to openly question the loyalty and honesty of 
speci ic diplomats.45
This condemnation climaxed in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, 
and was given a quasi-academic foundation when three young social scientists 
and anti-marketeers published: The Unfaithful Servants – The Civil Service in the 
EC-struggle. They argued that the civil service, and especially the diplomats, went 
beyond the established administrative norms. The ‘centre’ and social elites were 
overrepresented in the MFA, and the diplomats were both personally and profes-
sionally invested in the case: “Central parts of the foreign policy oriented civil 
service, such as the MFA and the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping (MoCS), can 
be said to have entered the EEC already in the early 1960s.”46
Whether the Europeans in fact had overstepped the boundaries of diplomatic 
norms or not was at this point irrelevant. Shortly after the negative referendum, 
many of the Europeans went to the unusual step of either leaving the diplomatic 
service, or transferring to remote places.47 Two main motivations stood out: Bit-
ter disappointment with the end result; and/or a feeling of being discredited or 
questioned to such a degree that it rendered them unable to work with European 
matters at least for a while.48 Ambassador to Brussels Jahn Halvorsen probably 
summed up what many of the Europeans thought, in a personal letter to Prime Mi-
nister Trygve Bratteli right after the negative referendum:
Dear Trygve! (...) The room for manoeuvre that the Government has bestowed on its 
civil servants is in reality a necessity for our entire system and our political debate. 
With Norway having such a small milieu, we would loose something essential if the ci-
vil servants could not present and explain the Government’s policies. We now run the 
risk of civil servants not daring to give their opinion, not even internally, if it should 
run counter to the opinion of shifting Governments. Partly because they may feel that 
they become unpopular, partly because leaks and other channels to the press might 
be used. Then we’re truly in danger.49
45 Dagbladet, 4.4.1962, 28.10.1962, 21.3.1963; Dagbladet, 25.7.1972, “Utenriksdepartemen-
tet orienterer”, Thorstein Eckhoff; Dagbladet 29.2.1972; Arbeiderbladet 9.3.1972, Thorstein 
Eckhoff; Stortingstidende (St.t.) (1971-72), p. 2541.
46 Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (red.): De Utro Tjenere, p. 79. My translation.
47 Eivinn Berg left the service for many years, and worked as a director in the Norwegian 
Shipping Association; Arild Holland was asked to stay on for a while, to negotiate the trade 
agreement, but left the service afterwards, in 1974, to become head of the Association of 
Pulp and Paper Industries; Asbjørn Skarstein was transferred to Ottawa; Tim Greve beca-
me director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in 1974.
48 https://nbl.snl.no/Eivinn_Berg (01.02.2015); Interview 18.12.2012: “Håkon W. Freihow”; 
Holland: Utenrikstjenestens historie, pp. 24-28.
49 AA/D/Da/A/044/6/2/L0012 – September 27, 1972, Brussels – Jahn Halvorsen – Dear Tryg-
ve. My Translation.
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With the end of the EC-struggle, then, the Europeans had challenged the tradi-
tional norms of diplomacy through political agitation fuelled by personal convic-
tion. Moreover, they had been challenged by the anti-marketeers who effectively 
condemned them to an existence outside the Norwegian political discourse as a 
foreign (European) element. It was this dual challenge to their professional selves, 
combined with the shock of the negative referendum that would lead to a reinter-
pretation of the ingrained understanding of themselves as heroic diplomats.
THE HEROIC DIPLOMAT
In his study of Norwegian diplomats, Neumann distinguishes a bureaucratic, a he-
roic and a mediator story, and argues that juggling them successfully is what consti-
tutes a good diplomat.50 The three stories, Neumann argues, resemble Western so-
ciety’s stories of what it means to be a good human in general. Philosopher Charles 
Taylor identi ied (at least) two such scripts or stories: One concerns the decency of 
everyday life: “[D]oing all the little things that are expected of you in a wide range 
of different contexts (...) This story celebrates low-key, monotonous labouring life. 
It has no place for heroics in the sense of exceptionalism”, Neumann explains.51 Ra-
ther, it is heroism in the shape of endurance. The image is the silent and admirable 
suffering of Christ. This makes up the bureaucratic story of the diplomat.52
The other story Taylor unveils concerns the good deed. “This is a hero story”, 
Neumann assesses, involving exceptional individual feats and spurs of creative 
genius. Here we are dealing with warrior ethics and turning water into wine. 
Such imagery underlies the heroic career diplomat. The face of the hero diplomat 
when at home is that of an adviser, “as close to the action as possible”, thriving 
in pulsating secretariats and mixing strictly diplomatic work with political ac-
tions. The face of the hero diplomat when stationed abroad is that of the ield dip-
lomat. “The deed may be to found a new station in conditions of particular hard-
ship, to undertake a particular arduous fact- inding mission, or to mastermind 
and stage a political fait accompli such as a conference against the opposition of 
rival diplomats”.53
The last story, which Neumann educes from his studies of the Norwegian 
MFA, is the self-effacing mediator. This story is speci ic for diplomacy, he argues, 
and is central to their understanding of what constitutes a good diplomat. For ex-
ample, the diplomat always speaks on behalf of someone, not in his/her own ca-
pacity.54 One of the most important tasks of a diplomat is to successfully prepare 
50 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 125.
51 Iver B. Neumann: “To be a Diplomat”, International Studies Perspectives 6, 2005, p. 73.
52 Charles Taylor W.: Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1989.
53 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 98.
54 Captured in the way diplomats act as mediums of national interests, and make statements 
such as “Norway believes ...” or “Norway cannot accept”.
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sites (of negotiation) for others. When the negotiations are concluded, politicians 
– not diplomats – will put their name to the papers.55 Diplomacy, Neumann points 
out, “is about easing communication by turning yourself into an optimally func-
tioning medium between other actors”.56
In a sense, all three stories are heroic, albeit in different ways. The stories 
call upon different, and sometimes contradictory, requirements from the diplo-
mat. Underpinning these stories are more speci ic ‘role expectations’, where roles 
could be understood as “formalised or normalised expectations that de ine the 
ideal behaviour of groups of actors”.57 Following Weberian standards, Norwe-
gian diplomats – much like British or Danish diplomats – traditionally adhered 
to the norms of professional independence and political neutrality.58 Just like the 
three stories, this pair of norms re lected a built-in tension of diplomacy. In his 
now classic publication, Diplomacy, famous British interwar diplomat, Sir Harold 
Nicolson explains: 
The civil service, of which the diplomatic service is a branch, is supposed to possess to 
politics. Its duty is to place its experience at the disposal of the Government in power, 
to tender advice, and if need be to raise objections. Yet, if that advice [is] disregarded 
by the Minister, as representative of the sovereign people, it is the duty and function of 
the civil service to execute his instructions without further question.59 
One of the Europeans working with the EC-case, Terje Johannessen (Member of 
the Market Committee, 1966-70), thought along similar lines:
[The] irst task is to ensure that the Government’s policies are implemented. And here 
there are almost no exceptions, you must implement. It is part of the parliamenta-
ry system of governance and the division of labour. But, at the same time, it must be 
equally clear that if you perceive that what the Government is doing is, shall we say, 
obviously contrary to the interests of the nation, then you must be allowed to speak 
up – without it having personal consequences.60
55 Iver B. Neumann: Diplomatic Sites – A Critical Enquiry, London: Hurst & Company 2013.
56 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 121.
57 J.G. March and Johan P. Olsen: Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis for politics, 
New York: Free Press 1989; Karen Gram-Skjoldager: “Bringing the Diplomat back in. Ele-
ments of a new historical Research Agenda”, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 13, 2011, p. 9.
58 Dag Ingvar Jacobsen: Administrasjonens makt – om forholdet mellom politikk og admini-
strasjon, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget 1997, p. 18-23; Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik: 
Kampen om EF, Oslo: PAX forlag 1977. Delineating the outer perimeter of these norms, § 62 
of the Norwegian Constitution states that civil servants should not be electable to the Stor-
ting; while § 100 secures the general freedom of expression, which civil servants also enjoy. 
59 Harold Nicolson: Diplomacy, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1969, p. 42.
60 Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”. My translation.
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Equally, Eivinn Berg (Industrial Counsellor to Brussels, 1970-72) explained that it 
was a civil servant’s duty to follow the governments chosen path “if he feels [that 
it is right] from a professional point of view, and from the point of view of the en-
vironment he works in”.61
The roles pull in opposite directions – one stressing loyalty, the other inde-
pendence – and echo the bureaucratic and heroic story, respectively.62 Political 
scientist Knut Dahl Jacobsen, studying Norwegian civil servants in the 1950s and 
1960s, argued that the vagueness of role expectations enabled the civil servants 
to embody contradictory norms. Since both political neutrality and professional 
independence was needed, and the balance between the two depended on the cir-
cumstances, any clear rule would be unsatisfying.63 Also from a functional point 
of view, then, being a successful diplomat meant balancing contradictory heroic 
requirements.
THE EUROPEANS AND THE DIPLOMATIC 
Through a careful reading of the interviews conducted, using Neumann’s cate-
gories, it becomes clear that the Europeans’ understanding of what made a good 
diplomat was narrated along the lines of the three stories. The bureaucratic sto-
ry – of the enduring character that does what is expected of him, no matter what 
– was captured by Håkon W. Freihow (Press Attaché at the Embassy in Brussels, 
1971-72), when he told the story of how Jahn Halvorsen, Ambassador to Brussels, 
reacted to the negative referendum in September 1972:
I remember right before the referendum, I had bought a lot of champagne to the Em-
bassy, we were supposed to give toasts. And then it happened – we did not become 
members – we were all very surprised. (...) We were, of course, very disappointed. But 
I remember Jahn Halvorsen, he was a passionate pro-European, had worked for it with 
his information back home, and through his broad network in the Commission (...) So, 
when the results were in, he disappeared up to his of ice, and then he called a meet-
ing, and stated: “The decision has been made, and our task, in these circumstances, is 
to work to obtain the best terms possible. The decision is made, and we must adhere, 
as we always do, to the instruction from ‘home’.” He was an exceptional civil servant. 
The ambassador, and I’ve had many good ones, but I rank him the highest.64
61 Interview 18.12.2012: “Eivinn Berg”. My translation.
62 Knut Dahl Jacobsen: ”Lojalitet, nøytralitet og faglig uavhengighet i sentraladministrasjo-
ner”, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 1, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1960, p. 232.
63 Dahl Jacobsen: ”Lojalitet, nøytralitet og faglig uavhengighet”, p. 243; Knut Getz Wold: ”Ad-
ministrasjon og politikk”, in Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (red.): De Utro Tjenere 1974, p. 
29-30. Another reason for the lack of rules was the ambition for a lexible Foreign Service. 
Too many rules would hamper the institutional elasticity, rendering it unable to adapt to 
shifting situations.
64 Interview 18.12.2012: “Håkon W. Freihow”. My translation.
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As can be noticed, Freihow, when referring to Halvorsen’s enduring and loyal 
characteristics, explicitly labelled him ‘an exceptional civil servant’, thus high-
lighting the bureaucratic traits of a diplomat. Similarly, both Johannessen and 
Berg, above, referred to themselves as civil servants when talking about the dip-
lomats’ requirements of neutrality and loyalty.65
The heroic story was also part of the Europeans’ self-perception. The opinion 
that they as diplomats were practitioners, out in the real world, as opposed to 
many other experts and civil servants, was fundamental. The heroic story entailed 
being ‘a man of action’, as captured in this re lection by Arne Langeland: ”I just did 
what I thought to be right. No, I didn’t have any philosophical re lections.”66 The 
diplomat was not trapped behind a desk, but someone who engaged with people. 
Arild Holland, member of the Market Committee and the negotiation secretariat 
(1966-72) , clearly made this distinction between being ‘book-smart’ and being 
a heroic diplomat: ”Everything concerning diplomacy, all negotiations, is about 
personal chemistry, the ability to socialize with people – it’s everything. You can 
be dumb as a bag of hammers – but if you’re able to win the hearts of those you 
negotiate with, you can go very far.”67
Arne Langeland also juxtaposed the two when re lecting on how legal expert 
at the MFA, Einar Løchen – who had written extensively on European integration 
– differed from career diplomats: “One thing is to have read and written about it. 
You know when you are in negotiations, when you negotiate, all that, that’s what 
we know. What should we do now? We should go this way or that way. How should 
we get there? (...) You don’t get that through reading.”68
Lastly, the Europeans also adhered to the mediating story. The notion of being 
able to build bridges between people, institutions or negotiating standpoints 
was an essential part of their professional self. As Neumann notes, it is the “ne-
gotiating itself, the doing that is seen to be of key importance”, where the diplo-
mat becomes an “optimally functioning medium” to the point of being self-effa-
cing.69 Terje Johannessen used the same imagery of a medium or channel: “You 
get, either consciously or subconsciously, a sense of what the receiver wants.”70 
Søren Chr. Sommerfelt – head of negotiations at deputy level in 1971-72 – wrote 
of how he mediated estrangement between Commission President Franco Maria 
Malfatti and Norwegian nature, by facilitating a site that educed understanding:
65 Interview 18.12.2012: “Eivinn Berg”; Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”.
66 Langeland was a junior executive of icer (1960), executive of icer (1961-62) and Head of Of-
ice (1962-65) for the 4th/5th Economic Of ice. Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. My 
translation.
67 Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”. My translation. 
68 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
69 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats, p. 120-121.
70 Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”. My translation. 
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Yes, Signor and Signora Malfatti experienced our northern winters, with clear wea-
ther and cold. One day we were standing on the pier of one of Tromsø’s local dignita-
ries, Alfons Kræmer, and saw one of his ishing boats coming in from the Arctic Ocean. 
It had been out in some rough weather, and both the deck and the windows were co-
vered with ice. The boat docked – everything was lifeless until the hatch opened on 
the front deck, and out crawled a creature that had to be human, as it walked on two. 
Everything was wrapped in something black, including the hat with long laps. Inside, 
behind the scarf one could see a couple of narrow eyes – that’s all. It was a miracle how 
this creature managed to claw his way from the icy deck down towards the pulpit. It 
was then that our Italian guests, especially she, understood that ishing in Northern 
Norway was something special and required special arrangements.71
The meeting was between the harsh Norwegian nature and the Malfattis, Som-
merfelt merely made it happen.72
All of these deeply ingrained stories of what it meant to be a good diplomat 
were templates that the Europeans drew upon when they remembered and nar-
rated themselves in the interviews. Moreover, they were present in their diploma-
tic practice – how they worked with the EC-case – in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Following the negative referendum, the juggling diplomat hero had to be rein-
vented for the Europeans to remember the EC-debacle in a meaningful way.
MEMORIES OF WAR
To understand how the diplomat hero was reinvented following the negative 
referendum, we need to explore how their memories of the Second World War 
play(ed) an important part in their work with the EC-case, their interpretation of 
the negative referendum, and their narrative of themselves today. The remaining 
four sections analyse how the memories of war, concepts of peace and their diplo-
matic self-perception can be understood at different ‘locations’ in relation to the 
EC-case and the failed referendum. As will be seen, the Europeans’ understanding 
of the EC/EU as a peace project has developed since the 1960, and is crucial in or-
der to grasp their narrative of themselves as martyrs.
The Second World War occupied and occupies a vast space in the Europeans’ 
memories, works, and publications. Being kids, youth or young adults during the 
war, most of them have unadorned and childish memories of life during the occu-
pation, often free of intricate political analysis.73 Thorvald Stoltenberg, 12 years 
old in 1943, experienced the war from a cottage north of Oslo. He kept track of the 
71 Sommerfelt: Sendemann, p. 149. My translation.
72 Costas M. Constantinou: “Diplomacy, Spirituality, Alterity”, in James Der Derian and Costas 
M. Constantinou (eds.): Sustainable Diplomaties Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan 2010, p. 
68; James Der Derian: On Diplomacy: A Geneology of Western Estrangement, Oxford: Black-
well 1987.
73 The average age of the Europeans was just shy of 17 years in 1940.
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progress of the allied forces through two sisters living nearby delivering illegal 
news – and made frontlines with needles and threads on a giant map of Europe 
in his room.74 Arne Langeland described the German occupation of a small, unna-
med town in Norway, in his semi- ictional novel, My little town (1988), based part-
ly on his memories from the war:
The 11th of April the Germans marched into the town. They had stayed on the out-
skirts for twenty-four hours or so – the boys had seen them. A small detachment of 
Norwegian soldiers was sent towards them but was quickly withdrawn. People led 
from the city, they got away in cars, busses and lorries. The farms in the area took 
them in, all kinds of rumours spread. Young boys and men poured into the police sta-
tion and the district sheriff’s of ice to be mobilized – to no avail. Nobody knew any-
thing; nobody knew what he or she was supposed to do, or where to enquire. Men 
cried overtly, they felt debased.75 
Langeland vividly describes how adults around him reacted to the occupation, 
seen from a young boy’s perspective (Langeland was 12 years old in 1940). Even 
though they did not take an active part in the war, their experiences of it were of-
ten dramatic. Many of the Europeans remember, for example, how their fathers 
were taken prisoners by German troops:
The summer of 1942, the family was on vacation at Hadeland, where his father had 
rented a cottage at a farm. One day a black car approached on the inroad, stopped 
outside the cottage and took Emil [the father] with it. He was arrested again. All Nor-
wegian of icers were now to be taken. After that day Thorvald disliked black cars.76
Those a bit older had more concrete confrontations with, and memories of, war, 
and perhaps more articulate resentments. Arild Holland, for example, voiced such 
resentments
I have experienced war: My mother’s home town, Kristiansund, was bombed to the 
ground in April 1940; my father was severely injured in 1943; two, slightly older, 
school-mates of mine were tortured to death; my closest friend and neighbour was 
imprisoned for nearly a year (17 years old) and suffered from it afterwards; and I was 
on Gestapo’s list, but got away by sheer luck.77
74 Geir Salvesen: Thorvalds Verden, Oslo: Schibsted 1994, p. 17.
75 Arne Langeland: Min lille by, Oslo: Grøndahl & Søn Forlag 1988, p. 43. My translation; Inter-
view 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. 
76 Salvesen: Thorvalds Verden, p. 15. His father was sent to the concentration camp Lucken-
walde, outside of Berlin, in 1943. Similarly, Tacred Ibsen Jr., Asbjørn Skarstein, Arild Hol-
land and Håkon W. Freihow’s fathers were imprisoned by the Germans.
77 Interview 20.02.2013: “Arild Holland”. My translation.
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14 years of age when the war came to Norway, Arild Holland remembered hiding 
on the rooftop of a building until night came – afraid to go home – while Gestapo 
arrested many of his friends. Many years later he thought he was dreaming away 
the war while he was hiding up there.78 Asbjørn Skarstein, 21 years old in 1943, 
had just started studying for his degree in economics in Bergen, when he was tip-
ped off that German troops would arrest students. Skarstein, and some friends 
of his, led Bergen on bikes, and crossed the mountains from Western Norway to 
Eastern Norway. Afraid that Gestapo would ind him in his hometown, Oslo, Skar-
stein sought refuge at his grandfather’s cabin in Southern Norway. While in hid-
ing, Skarstein followed the events of the war via BBC’s radio broadcasting.79
The youngest Europeans, like Terje Johannessen (5 years old in 1940), had 
very vague memories of wartime Norway. Growing up during the war he recog-
nised that war “was a bad thing”. Johannessen had, on the other hand, clearer me-
mories of the immediate postwar years, and came to link the years of occupation 
with Soviet annexations in the early cold war:
Our generation, we will never be entirely free from what we grew up with. First you 
had the war itself and the occupation of a small, peaceful country, as we were; then, 
even more signi icantly, what happened in Eastern Europe, with those countries, 
especially with Czechoslovakia. It has left a mark that is always a part of our mind-
set.80
Only the oldest Europeans took directly part in the war: Jahn Halvorsen, 24 years 
of age in 1940, participated in the battle of Narvik, where allied forces irst pus-
hed back the Germans and then capitulated.81 Working in London during the war, 
Søren Chr. Sommerfelt (24 in 1940) recalled how “sometimes, when the bombs 
were raining down, I volunteered as a ireguard”. Even during the worst times of 
German bombing, he goes on, the small bottles of milk would be delivered to his 
doorstep in London – every day. As long as the milk was delivered, he rounds off, 
“I knew victory would be ours, sooner or later.”82 
Thousands and thousands of contemporary Norwegians and millions of con-
temporary Europeans shared such experiences. Memories like those of the Euro-
peans were common to a whole generation who had felt the horrors of war irst 
hand. The point here is not the veracity of these experiences and memories, but 
rather how the Europeans came to explicitly link them with European integra-
tion. Through their work with the EC-case, the Europeans’ memories of The Se-
78 Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”.
79 Interview 08.04.2014: “Tove Skarstein”.
80 Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”. My translation. 
81 Aftenposten 15.05.1976: ”Ambassadør Jahn Halvorsen”, by Helge Seip.
82 Sommerfelt: Sendemann, p. 37-38, 49.
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cond World War were given a new meaning. The concept of peace was practiced 
and narrated into the integration project – and eventually came to serve as an 
enduring emotionally charged rationale for why membership was necessary.
PEACE & INTEGRATION
The Europeans’ linkage between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ can be traced back to 
their work with multilateral diplomacy in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s – and espe-
cially their work with the EC-case. In this environment their memories of war 
were given a new signi icance. Since then, the relationship between ‘war’, ‘peace’ 
and ‘integration’ has been an important aspect of the Europeans’ narrative. 
Today the Europeans inextricably conjoin experiences of war, the quest for 
peace, and their support of Norway joining the European Community. So much so, 
that all three aspects often appear in the same sentence. Håkon W. Freihow, for 
example, explains that the arrest of his father during the war and himself having 
to go into hiding “contributed signi icantly in shaping my view of Europe in the 
future. I became a warm supporter of the EC”.83 Similarly, Thorvald Stoltenberg 
links the three: 
What preoccupied me, what preoccupied many of us, was ‘never again war’, and how 
to build peace. In the 1950s I didn’t know of, and still today I don’t know of, a better 
way to do it than by making people mutually dependent on each other (...) and the ne-
cessity of supranationalism, it’s deeply rooted within me, and has been with me since 
my days as a student.84 
These are clear examples of what Ricoeur called the threefold mimesis, in which 
the narrative created to order one’s experiences, in turn becomes an integrated 
part of one’s identity.85 
83 Interview 16.05.2013: “Håkon W. Freihow”. My translation.
84 Interview 24.02.2014: “Thorvald Stoltenberg”. My translation.
85 As Michael Andersen explains “the most accessible way to understand the mimesis model 
is to look at it from the point of view of a literary work, where there is a relation between 
the Work, the World and the Interpreter”. Accordingly, the threefold mimesis is made up 
of 1) the pre iguration of the world – that is the pre-conceptions humans have ordering our 
experience of the world 2) the narrative con- iguration of the world, that is how stories ar-
range events into a ‘plot’ – a meaningful whole with a beginning, middle and end, and 3) the 
re- iguration, where the ‘text’, as it is read by the interpreter with abilities mentioned un-
der 1), is connected with the world. With re- iguration the imaginative perspectives from 
the ‘emplotment’ is integrated into the lived experience – they become part of one’s identity. 
Quote: Andersen: A Question of Location, p. 91. For a short description, see: Dorthe Gert Si-
monsen: Tegnets tid: fortid, historie og historicitet efter den sproglige vending, Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum 2003, p. 246-247. For the full details, see: Paul Ricoeur: Time and Nar-
rative (Temps et Récit), Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago: Uni-
versity Press of Chicago 1984 [1983], pp. 54-77.
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This mantra of ‘never again war’ is something all of the Europeans uttered du-
ring interviews. It makes clear the important link created between peace and in-
tegration, but also evidences how many times this link must have been retold as 
a story. Consider, for example, Arild Holland’s memories of how he, immediately 
after de Gaulle’s irst veto, understood the signi icance of the EC:
And then I remember that I, one weekend, took all the papers we [the MFA] had on 
the Communities with me home and sat a Saturday and Sunday late in January 1963 
and read and studied, studied and read, and then I understood the whole thing. This 
wasn’t bloody economy – that was just a means to an end. It was about abolishing war 
in Europe, just like I had dreamt when I was sitting on the kerb during the war. That’s 
when I became Norway’s biggest EC advocate.86
Arild Holland’s de ining moment is described with literary features (‘read and 
studied, studied and read’) often found in Norwegian fairy tales.87 The linearity 
of his memories is also striking: The dreams from his childhood were about to be-
come a reality. Two major life events have been narrated together.
Arne Langeland also draws a direct line between war, peace and integration: 
“Yes, because it was after the war (...) and when we spoke with each other, it was 
about keeping Europe together. It was something fundamental within us. (...) The 
signi icant part for me was: Now that the war is over, we shall all live together.”88 
Equally, Terje Johannessen instinctively link the two: “I saw it as an instrument to 
create peace, keep in mind it was only 10-12 years since the war, and I had grown 
up with the war.”89
The conjoining of ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ was something that slowly develo-
ped through their work with the EC-case in the 1960s and early 1970s. In a Nor-
wegian setting, it came to be their unique ‘take’ on the membership issue. There 
were many sources to this: large parts of the political and administrative elite in-
volved with the European Communities, and earlier in Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and other organizations, were convinced of the be-
ne its of peaceful multilateral cooperation. This conviction was shared by anyone 
from hard-boiled federalists to cautious intergovernmentalists.90 The Europeans, 
working within the framework of multilateral economic diplomacy, took part in 
the discourse of integration as an instrument of peace in Paris of the 1950s or 
86 Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”. My translation.
87 It is a ‘way of speaking’, that clearly gives it a genre quality and also tells us that the sto-
ry most likely has been told many times over, that draws on the fairy tales of Per Chr. As-
bjørnsen and Jørgen Moe Norske Folkeeventyr I-III, Oslo: Aschehough 2012.
88 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
89 Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”. My translation.
90 Katja Seidel: The process of politics in Europe – The rise of European elites and supranational 
institutions, Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2010, p. 37, 120. 
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Brussels of the 1960s. When Langeland recalled that they spoke about ‘keeping 
Europe together’, for example, he referred to his French, Danish and British col-
leagues at OEEC in Paris in the mid-1950s.91 This in luence is equally evident from 
Asbjørn Skarstein dispatch in February 1962, where he tried to remind the poli-
ticians back home that the European Economic Community (EEC) was not only 
about economics: “The Treaty of Rome is therefore – in its consequence – a peace 
movement that, with its effective measures, could possibly be compared with the 
League of Nations or the United Nations. This, at least seems to be true if one 
looks at the movement in a historical perspective.”92 
Moreover, the Europeans became increasingly involved with the European 
Movement in Norway (EMN) in the 1960s. The EMN had, since its creation, expli-
citly linked peace and integration, and the Europeans came to adhere to this lan-
guage and rationale. Following Britain’s irst application, chairman of the EMN 
Terje Wold, thought Norway’s of icial attitude to Europe had been “pathetic”. 
The Government now had to take part in the integration process and understand 
“what such a Europe can contribute to peace and international coexistence”.93 
Soon after de Gaulle’s irst veto, MFA secretary Magne Reed discussing the EMN’s 
future with European Jahn Halvorsen, proclaimed that: “The basic idea of  Euro-
pean cooperation is to clean out the last vestiges of historical con licts, power 
struggles and economic troubles in Europe, thus making a new war unthinkable 
and impossible.”94 
Furthermore, in negotiating with the Community, the Europeans came to de-
velop and articulate an explicitly political rationale for membership in the EC. 
This strategy was developed as a possible way to square the domestic demands 
for speci ic economic solutions and permanent exemptions from the Treaties of 
Rome, with the leeway given in the negotiations with the Six in Brussels. Arne 
Langeland and Jahn Halvorsen were among the irst to interpret Norwegian mem-
bership of the EEC as a continuation of the Atlantic policy of the Labour Govern-
ment, followed since 1949.95 Thus, the tactical considerations of the Europeans 
91 Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”.
92 UD 44.36/6.84 – File 8 – February 21, 1962, Brussels – N.A. Jørgensen (Asbjørn Skarstein) – 
Norges stilling til det økonomiske og politiske Fellesskap i Europa. 
93 Riksarkivet (RA)/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – December 9, 1961, Oslo – Meddelelse fra for-
mannen nr. 55 den 9. Desember 1961. Innhold: Norge og Europa.
94 UD 44.36/6.84 P. – File 1 – April 2, 1963, Oslo – Magne Reed – Notat. Europa-komiteen. Mål-
setting og arbeidsoppgaver. Samarbeid med Europabevegelsens Norske Råd. “Grunntanken 
i europeiske samarbeid er å rydde ut de siste rester av historiske motsetninger, maktkamp 
og økonomiske trengsler i Europa, og dermed gjøre en ny krig utenkelig og umulig.”
95 See for example: UD 44.36/6.84 – File 7 – January 17, 1962 – Arne Langeland – Memo. Pro-
spect for discussion about Norways placement in the enlarged European Economic Commu-
nity. Arne Langeland was perhaps the irst European who tried to push the Government to 
stress the political reasons for a Norwegian membership application during the irst round 
(1960-1963). Followed by Jahn Halvorsen, then William G. Solberg and Asbjørn Skarstein 
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linked Atlantic security, and therefore the avoidance of war, with membership 
in the EC in a Cold War setting. “It was foresight that lay behind the Norwegian 
London-Government’s Atlantic policy, while country and people lay ridden by the 
German occupants”, Sommerfelt wrote in his 1997 memoirs, and he continued 
“[f]or me membership in the EC was a continuation of the economic and political 
line followed for 25 years since the victory and the peace.”96
Last, the Europeans, especially diplomat-turned-parliamentarian Knut Fry-
denlund, helped facilitate the Labour Party’s social democratic vision of Euro-
pe in the mid- to late-1960s. This vision explicitly linked ideas of ‘solidarity’ and 
‘world peace’ with the political project of a more socialist Europe. The Labour 
Party leadership – Party Leader Trygve Bratteli and Party Secretary Haakon Lie 
– together with a new generation of Labour politicians – Per Kleppe, Knut Fry-
denlund and Reiulf Steen – developed this vision together with a dense pro-Euro-
pean social democratic network that spanned across Europe.97 Trygve Bratteli, 
for example, consistently understood and articulated the membership issue as a 
matter of perpetuating peace.98 Young European Terje Johannessen recalled how 
Bratteli, echoing the lessons of the interwar period, often said: “The day commo-
dities stop crossing the borders, the armies will come instead”.99 
Already in the 1960s, then, the Europeans drew a rather direct line between 
their memories of war, European integration, and the prospect of peace. The com-
bination of the Europeans’ generational understanding, education and work with 
the EC-case, and with it, their connections abroad and at home created a speci-
ic link between peace and integration. It was this understanding the Europeans 
tried to convey to the electorate up until the referendum.
THE INAUGURATED FEW
During their work with the EC-case, the Europeans contrasted their unique un-
derstanding of why membership was necessary with what they understood as 
the lack of knowledge among the Norwegian electorate. The fundamental task 
was to make the voters understand what they, the Europeans, already did. Suc-
cessive Governments chose to discuss the membership issue almost exclusive-
ly in economic terms, and there was no of icial information campaign until the 
at the Embassy in Brussels together with Secretary Eivinn Berg at the MFA, and later still 
Arild Holland.
96 Sommerfelt: Sendemann, p. 156. My translation.
97 Dag Axel Kristoffersen: “A Social Democratic Vision for Europe? The Norwegian Labour 
Party’s European Policy (1965-1972)”, in Marloes Beers and Jenny Ra lik (ed.): Culture na-
tionales et identité communautaire: un dé i pour l´Union européenne, Brussels: Peter Lang, 
2010, pp. 217-228; Kristian Steinnes: The British Labour Party and the Question of EEC/EC 
Membership, 1960-72. A Reassessment, Unpublished PhD thesis, Trondheim: NTNU 2010.
98 Roy Jacobsen: Trygve Bratteli – En Fortelling, Oslo: J.W. Cappelens Forlag 1995.
99 Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”.
71
last months before the referendum.100 The Europeans, therefore, often displayed a 
tension, between their wish to bridge the gap between ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’, and 
feelings of resignation over what they saw as a misguided debate, and the general 
ignorance and the inward-looking nature of Norwegians.
During the irst round (1960-1963) Langeland stressed that membership of 
the EEC had to be presented as a continuation of the Labour Government’s foreign 
and security policy throughout the post-war era. It was in the best interest of Nor-
way to become a full member, not least to avoid exclusion from a dynamic commu-
nity, which included all the countries that guaranteed Norwegian security, bar 
the US. Therefore, it was necessary to create an understanding based on political 
arguments:
It is hardly realistic to try to create a kind of ‘European enthusiasm’ in Norway. It 
would run contrary to profound traits in the Norwegian mentality. [...] But, we have 
to be able to create an understanding for the fundamental foreign and security policy 
interests we have to protect, in this world of which we are a part.101
Langeland wanted to convey to the electorate that though they were unenthused, 
membership was a political necessity. In order to do this it was important to avoid 
pushing purely economic questions to the fore. To Brussels, on the other hand, it 
was important to show that one wished to take part “as a loyal member”.102 He ar-
gued for a negotiation tactic based on trust, as he acidiously remarked: “We are, 
after all, joining a Community.”103 
His comments on ‘European enthusiasm’, taking part ‘as a loyal member’ and 
‘joining a Community’, are riddled with tension. Langeland placed himself on the 
outside of what he understood as a Norwegian mentality; and simultaneously re-
100  Dag Axel Kristoffersen: “Norway’s Policy towards the EEC – The European Dilemma of the 
Centre Right Coalition (1965-1971)”, in Katrin Rücker and Laurent Warlouzet (ed.): Which 
Europe(s)? New Approaches in European Integration History. Brussels: Peter Lang,  Euro-
clio no 36, 2006; Hans Otto Frøland: “Advancing Ambiguity: On Norway’s application for 
EEC-membership in 1962”, in Svein Dahl (ed.): National interest and the EEC/EC/EU, Det 
Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskab. Skrifter 1:99, Trondheim: Tapir Forlag 1999; 
Tamnes: Oljealder.
101  UD 44.36/6.84 – April 18, 1962, Oslo – Arne Langeland – Memo. Norway’s relationship 
with the European Economic Community. Certain remarks. “Det er neppe realistisk å for-
søke å bygge opp noen Europa-begeistring i Norge. Det ville stride mot dyptgående trekk 
i norsk tankegang. [...] Men vi må kunne klare å bygge opp forståelse for de grunnliggende 
[sic] utenrikspolitiske og sikkerhetspolitiske interesser vi må ta vare på i den verden vi nå 
engang lever.”
102  UD 44.36/6.84 – April 18, 1962, Oslo – Arne Langeland – Memo. Norway’s relationship 
with the European Economic Community. Certain remarks.
103  UD 44.36/6.84 – File 12 – May 2, 1962 – J.Nr. 06844 II – AL/AS – Memo to state secretary 
Engen. EEC – time schedule and negotiation strategy - 5th Trade-Political Unit, by Arne 
Langeland.
72
vealed that he, as opposed to others, had adopted a Community-thinking. He thus 
extracted himself from the Norwegian discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’, and 
spoke of himself as a European. But he did not only distance himself from the Nor-
wegian mentality, he juxtaposed it to ‘trust’ in the outside world – the Norwegian 
mentality was therefore portrayed as myopic. 
Similarly, when Otto Kildal retired in 1967, after serving as ambassador to 
Brussels and The Hague, he felt the need to comment upon what he thought was 
a derailed and parochial membership debate in the Norwegian Parliament: “The 
Community is both a common market and a political idea of peace and coopera-
tion, and we have to strive towards membership even though there will be ob-
stacles along the way.” Asked by the journalist what he thought of the anti-mar-
keteers’ argument that Norway would loose its sovereignty, he answered: “Are 
there no limits to the small-town mentality and inferiority complexes? Shouldn’t 
Norway be able to raise its independent voice just as well as the Dutch within the 
Community, or the Belgians?”104
Likewise, Egil Winsnes at the Norwegian embassy in Paris, receiving compla-
ints about his lectures on Norway and the EC to visiting Norwegians, wrote back 
to MFA State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg:
I usually touch upon what I jestingly call the “long live Toten [a part of the agricultural 
inland in Norway], to hell with Norway”-mentality. A mentality in which the feeling of 
solidarity stops a few meters past the living room door, and which is the biggest ob-
stacle to building a communitarian solidary Europe.105
Though it is abundantly clear that the Europeans thought Norwegian attitudes to-
wards the Community was a problem, the aim was to overcome this hurdle. Still, 
even at the time, feelings of being outside, or above, are easy to detect. In 1962, 
Asbjørn Skarstein, for example, complained – after underlining that the EEC was 
“a peace movement” – that: “In light of such viewpoints and others, it’s dif icult to 
understand the Norwegian opposition to the European Communities – seen from 
the outside. It’s almost as if it’s from another time.”106
We are only able to appreciate the signi icance of these feelings of frustration 
and resignation in light of the role they played in memories of the Europeans af-
ter the negative referendum. For it was these feelings of being among the inaugu-
rated few that became cemented after the ‘no’. 50 years later what remained was 
the divide: “I came to understand it later – Norway was different. First of all we 
104  RA/PA-0965/Ff/L0029 – Norges Handels og Sjøfarts tidene 13.7.1967. My translation and 
italics.
105  UD 44.36/6.84 Informasjon – August 2, 1972, Paris – Egil Winsnes – Kjære Stoltenberg.
106  UD 44.36/6.84 – File 8 – February 21, 1962, Brussels – N.A. Jørgensen (Asbjørn Skarstein) 
– Norges stilling til det økonomiske og politiske Fellesskap i Europa. 
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didn’t know the irst thing about the world. Only the seafarers knew anything. 
Furthermore – how should I say this – we were on the outside, and we had this 
government led by Gerhardsen, who was negative to everything.”107
”In Norway”, Langeland continues, ”there was a fundamental distrust of Ger-
many; and of France, and the Italians, all these southern Europeans. The level of 
distrust was immense. (...) Here we touch upon something fundamental: Norwe-
gians didn’t understand the irst thing about this. Even the most educated people 
didn’t understand it. There was a fundamental scepticism, which exists to this 
day.” When I tried to press him on why they didn’t understand, Langeland replied: 
“The country is far to the north, middle of nowhere.”108 He himself, on the other 
hand, saw it differently: “I reacted the way I did because I didn’t have any objec-
tions. It was perfectly ine with me that the world turned out like this. I had no 
preconceived notions. And I thought it was exciting.”109 
Arild Holland too gives a tangible example of the difference between being 
among those who understood and those who didn’t: He recalled being in Geneva 
during the irst round of negotiation (1961-63), when “all the former Stalinists, 
communists and other radical leftists suddenly appeared [in Norway] and vivid-
ly portrayed the EC as a malaise.” Even Holland’s old teacher at the University, 
famous economist Ragnar Frisch, which he respected deeply, called the EC the 
‘unenlightened plutocracy’. “Everybody wrote and spoke of economy”, Holland 
remembers, “no one – absolutely no one – understood that this was about perma-
nently ending war in Europe.”110 
By contrast, fellow European, and ambassador to Brussels, Jahn Halvorsen, 
understood what the EC was about: “We had a common view on things (...) he un-
derstood the meaning of this whole thing.”111 Equally, Arild Holland’s obituary of 
Asbjørn Skarstein is illuminating:
In Brussels too [1962-63], Asbjørn Skarstein was the right man in the right place. He 
was one of the irst in Norway that understood the background for the EEC-coope-
ration. Even though it was about economic cooperation, it was also a comprehensive 
peace initiative – making a new war in Western Europe impossible. EEC’s peace aspect 
was decisive in Skarstein’s positive attitude towards Norwegian membership.112
The inextricable link between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ de ined what it meant to 
be among the inaugurated few.
107  Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
108  Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
109  Interview 01.05.2012: “Arne Langeland”. My translation.
110  Interview 09.01.2014: “Arild Holland”. My translation.
111  Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”. My translation.
112  Aftenposten 28.10.1999: ”Asbjørn Skarstein”, by Arild Holland. My translation. 
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Holland, as Langeland, portrays Norway as myopic and provincial, when ex-
plaining the enthusiasm among parliamentarians when Denmark suggested a 
Nordic Economic Union (NORDEC) following de Gaulle’s second veto in 1967: “It 
it the Norwegian parliamentarians like a glove, most of them do not know any 
languages, but they loved ‘Norden’, because then they could speak their mother 
tongue [said in a broad dialect] you know.”113
Tancred Ibsen Jr. makes the same distinction, contrasting himself to the Nor-
wegian mentality, when explaining why he became so invested in the members-
hip issue: “You could say I’m a European. I come from a segment of the people that 
has had just as many contacts abroad as at home. So, I’m a Norwegian European 
(...) And I thought that Norway should ind its place in Europe...” He remembered 
talking to Jahn Halvorsen after the negative referendum: “Jahn was distraught 
and angered. Absolutely. We were distraught. (...) But there was nothing you could 
do. The Norwegian people didn’t want to. We are... Norwegians are isolationists 
and dif icult.”114 Illustratively, he corrects himself in the last sentence, and places 
himself outside the discourse.
After the negative referendum the need to bridge the gap disappeared, and 
the bitter EC-struggle cemented the elements of con lict. The negative referen-
dum thus led to a subtle, but important, shift in the Europeans’ narrative:  They 
were among the inaugurated few who understood what the European Communi-
ty really was – namely a political project to prevent war. To their mind, neither the 
anti-marketeers nor the broad majority of the people understood this. More fun-
damentally, however, Norway was, and is, detached and different from Europe. 
One may note, therefore, that both the Europeans and the anti-marketeers placed 
‘the diplomat’ outside the Norwegian political discourse. 
Reading the quotes above, one gets an image of a few heroic diplomats ighting 
against a dominant force – their memories highlight how they were a discursive 
minority. Nowhere is this imagery more clear than in Arild Holland’s retelling of 
the day they travelled to the rati ication ceremony:
Saturday January 22, 1972 I was, together with some other civil servants, supposed to 
travel together with [Prime Minister] Bratteli and [Foreign Minister] Cappelen, both 
with spouses, to Brussels to take part in the rati ication ceremony. Already at Fornebu 
[Airport] the drama started (...) When I arrived in a taxi at Fornebu, a crowd had ga-
thered outside the entry. To my stupefaction I saw Bratteli and his wife surrounded 
by protesters, preventing them from entering. I was able to get Randi Bratteli under 
the arm, and together we forced our way through the crowd. At the entry I met a SAS-
employee and I asked him to take care of Mrs Bratteli who exclaimed: ‘Take care of my 
husband’! I ran back. Bratteli was still surrounded by squawking protesters, whom he 
113  Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”. My translation.
114  Interview 23.11.2013: “Tancred Ibsen Jr.”. My translation.
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tried to keep away by swirling a couple of travelling bags around. I was able to guide 
Bratteli out, as his driver came to help as well. Luckily, it didn’t come to violence. When 
we had broken out of the circle, the protesters began to sing ‘Ja, vi elsker’ [the Norwe-
gian national anthem]. It struck me as rather grotesque, when I thought about what 
Bratteli had been through as a prisoner in Germany.115
Rather than the diplomat heroically building bridges across landmasses almost 
impossibly far apart, the story became one of the Europeans being among the few 
who fought for a morally just cause, but were defeated at the hands of the unkno-
wing and unwilling masses. Widespread misconceived nationalism prevailed 
over righteous, peace-seeking cosmopolitanism. The personal and professional 
defeat of loosing the referendum, being discredited by the anti-marketeers and, 
in some instances, leaving the service, was thus squared with the story of the he-
roic diplomat in order to create meaning. In this imagery, it is clear that both the 
warrior-like and the self-effacing mediator hero faded to the background, what 
was left was the suffering and enduring hero. Thus, a new character rose from the 
ashes of the EC-struggle: The martyr.116
RETELLING STORIES
Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes rightly noted that “no two scenarios are alike, 
but some are more alike than others. The EC/EU-cases, as they developed up until 
to the critical decisions of 1972 and 1994, have many noticeable similarities.”117 
In both instances Norway was forced by external events to apply for membership 
negotiations before it was politically prepared and the Government was dragging 
its feet, negotiating a dif icult dossier and demanding special treatment. And both 
times, the primary sector and loss of sovereignty were the two major stumbling 
blocks in the negotiations, and the whole endeavour ended with the Norwegian 
electorate voting against membership.118 However, while 1972 was a de ining ge-
nerational experience, a landmark for an entire people, 1994 will irst and fo-
remost be remembered for the Winter Olympics in Lillehammer.119 There is no 
doubt the Europeans today feel the same way: 1994 was a pale repetition of 1972, 
which con irmed that Norway would continue to be referred to “the sidelines and 
marginalized from the economic and political integration in Europe” as Eivinn 
115  Holland: Utenrikstjenestens historie, p. 21. My translation.
116  De inition: One who chooses to suffer death rather than renounce religious principles; 
One who makes great sacri ices or suffers much in order to further a belief, cause, or prin-
ciple; One who endures great suffering; One who makes a great show of suffering in order 
to arouse sympathy.  http://www.thefreedictionary.com/martyr (29.01.15).
117  Tamnes: Oljealder, p. 153.
118  53,5 % and 52,2 % voted against entry in 1972 and 1994 respectively.
119  Tamnes: Oljealder, p. 159.
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Berg put it.120 The second negative referendum also strengthened their feeling of 
belonging to the inaugurated few:
The big mistake of the Borten- and the Bratteli Government both was that they failed 
to come out and explain why the EU was created: never again war in Europe. I tried 
time and again, but it fell on deaf ears. And the Brundtland Government repeated this 
mistake, when the new negotiations started in the 1990s. I warned, but was not he-
ard.121
Although retired from the MFA, Arild Holland engaged in the membership debate 
in the 1990s, giving interviews and lectures, but explained that he ‘gave up’ when 
he understood that the government once again focussed exclusively on economic 
matters.122 Terje Johannessen agreed: “Trade policy is security policy, and that is 
the politics of peace. And that dimension was completely missing – wasn’t even on 
the horizon in the Norwegian debate, neither in 72’ nor in 94’”.123 
“Now, inally, the peace perspective is starting to come to the fore with the 
handing out of the Nobel Peace Prize”, Holland mused in 2013, a year after the 
European Union had received it, as if to say that the mistakes repeated since the 
1960s might still be recti ied.124 “He’s been very preoccupied with the political 
aspects lately” Eivinn Berg noted about Holland, “he never brings something up 
in our group – the European Movement’s senior group – without giving a laming 
lecture on the Coal and Steel Community and Schuman and all that. Like hearing 
a new Peace Prize speech. And I fully agree with him, it was neglected.”125 The ar-
gument that the EC/EU has contributed to peace and stability has never had po-
pular appeal or even signi icantly coloured the Norwegian debate, former editor 
of the bourgeois newspaper Aftenposten Per Egil Hegge re lected in 2013. And, 
120  Minervanett 15.12.2009: “Norges nei til EU – 15 år etter”, by Eivinn Berg. http://www.mi-
nervanett.no/norges-nei-til-eu-%E2%80%93-15-ar-etter/ (08.04.2015). My translation. 
After several years as Director in the Norwegian Shipping Association, Eivinn Berg re-
turned to the MFA in the late 1970s, and was chief negotiator at deputy level both in the 
European Economic Area- and the enlargement negotiations with the EC/EU in the 1990s.
121  Interview 20.02.2013: “Arild Holland”. My translation.
122  Aftenposten 07.04.1992: ”EF en stor freds-suksess”, by Einar Solvoll. An interview with 
Arild Holland, where he makes clear that “Peace in Europe is the most important thing 
for me. The European Community has been an major success, when it comes to securing 
peace. The super powers would never allow Germany to be reunited if the EC didn’t stand 
as a guarantor of peace!”; Aftenposten 29.06.1994: “Ja til ansvar i Europa, trygghet og mu-
ligheter for Norge”, petition. Interview 09.01.2014: “Arild Holland”.
123  Interview 24.04.2012: “Terje Johannessen”. My translation.
124  Interview 20.02.2013: “Arild Holland”. My translation.
125  Interview 18.12.2012: “Eivinn Berg“. ” My translation.
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Hegge added: “for the ‘yes-people’ the Peace Prize (...) was a just and well founded 
appreciation”.126
As historian Alistair Thomson notes, in later life the process of ’life review’ – 
involving the time and desire to remember one’s life – comes in and strengthens 
the importance, and sometimes the accuracy, of long-term memory. Such a ten-
dency helps to structure temporally ’long’ plots, giving a whole meaning of one’s 
life.127 It is clear that today the Europeans make little distinction between the EC 
and the EU, or 72’ and 94’ – it is part of the same narrative. When Holland, Berg, 
Johannessen and other Europeans meet and share these experiences, they retell 
and remodel the story of themselves and Europe, and it seems that they strengt-
hen the causal link between war, peace and Europe. By ‘reliving’ the experience of 
1972, in 1994, they are con irmed in their belief that they are rather alone in un-
derstanding what European integration is really about. “Looking back from the 
conclusion to the episodes leading up to it”, Ricoeur wrote, “we have to be able to 
say that this ending required these sorts of events and this chain of actions”.128 It 
is this ictionalizing process that has created a meaningful experience out of the 
professional and personal failure of the negative referendum.
Today, all of the Europeans are retired, and live in the wealthy and esteemed 
western outskirts of Oslo. In fact, most of them live within walking distance of 
each other – a village, so to speak, of former diplomats. With few exceptions, they 
remain very close friends: They are ‘best friends’, or at least ‘close friends’, they 
are godfathers to each other’s children and served as ‘best man’ in each other’s 
weddings.129 Furthermore, many of them meet regularly at the European Move-
ment in Norway’s (EMN) of ices, as the so-called senior group130: Alone in sha-
ring this unique experience of working with the EC-case so closely, the Europeans 
meet, retell, and uphold the narrative of the diplomatic martyr. To this day they 
refer to themselves as Europeans.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has explored how the Europeans retell the story of their work with 
the EC-case and the shock of the Norwegian non-joining of the EC in September 
1972. It argues that the Europeans have reconciled the traumatic experience of 
the Norwegian ‘no’ with the ingrained heroic story of ‘the diplomat’, by narrating 
themselves as the inaugurated few who metaphorically sacri iced themselves for 
a just cause: Peace in Europe. Through this story of martyrdom, the heroic diplo-
mat, the memories of the Second World War and the purpose of EC membership is 
126  Minervanett 23.12.2014: “Ja-sidens EU-kamp”, by Per Egil Hegge http://www.minerva-
nett.no/ja-sidens-eu-kamp/ (09.04.2015). My translation.
127  Thomson: “Memory and remembering in oral history”, p. 82.
128  Ricoeur: ”Narrative and time”, p. 174.
129  Interview 27.04.2012: “Arild Holland”.
130  Interview 18.12.2012: “Eivinn Berg”.
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recast and reinterpreted to create a meaningful and whole narrative of who the 
Europeans are in the present.
H A A KON A .  I KONOMOU
PH . D.
DE PA R T M E N T OF H I S T ORY A N D C I V I L I Z AT ION
E U ROPE A N U N I V E R S I T Y I NS T I T U T E
H A A KON . I KONOMOU E U I . E U 
ABSTRACT
Haakon A. Ikonomou 
To remember like a diplomat
This article investigates how a tight-knit group of multilateral economic diplo-
mats – simply called the Europeans – retell their story of the shock of the Nor-
wegian non-joining of the European Community (EC) in September 1972. Draw-
ing on concepts from Paul Ricoeur and Iver B. Neumann, combini ng oral and 
archive-based history, this article argues that the Europeans have reconciled the 
ingrained heroic story of ‘the diplomat’ with the traumatic experience of the Nor-
wegian ‘no’ by narrating themselves as martyrs metaphorically sacri icing them-
selves for a just cause. Rather than fundamentally changing their story – for ex-
ample portraying themselves as failures – they elevate their cause to something 
unassailably virtuous: Peace in Europe.
